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Time, Saving Afghanistan’s Art:

“That anything is left at all is in large part due to the efforts of museum director Omar Khan Massoudi, his staff, and a small group of concerned archeologists and politicians. In 1988, they secretly moved the highlights of the collection to a vault in the Central Bank at the presidential palace. Massoudi, who risked his life to preserve his country’s cultural heritage, was one of seven men who had keys to the vault. All seven keys were needed to open it, so by spreading them around and keeping their locations secret (in case of death, a key reverted to the keeper’s eldest son), they were able to preserve the treasures.”

“Timers from washing machines and dryers, like these for sale at a parts store in Baghdad’s Rasheed Street district, are used by insurgents to detonate improvised explosive devices.”

Noah Shachtman, How Technology Almost Lost the War: In Iraq, the Critical Networks Are Social — Not Electronic:

“(…) The Defense Department wasn’t blind to the power of networks, of course — the Internet began as a military project, after all, and each branch of the armed services had ongoing “digitization” programs. But no one had ever crystallized what the information age might offer the Pentagon quite like Cebrowski and Garstka did. In an article for the January 1998 issue of the naval journal Proceedings, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” they not only named the philosophy but laid out a new direction for how the US would think about war.

Their model was Wal-Mart. Here was a sprawling, bureaucratic monster of an organization — sound familiar? — that still managed to automatically order a new lightbulb every time it sold one. Warehouses were networked, but so were individual cash registers. So were the guys who sold Wal-Mart the bulbs. If that company could wire everyone together and become more efficient, then US forces could, too. “Nations make war the same way they make wealth,” Cebrowski and Garstka wrote. Computer networks and the efficient flow of information would turn America’s chain saw of a war machine into a scalpel.”

Slate V:

“A Magnum photo essay. During his coverage of the fall of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime in 2002, photographer Thomas Dworzak discovered a stash of pictures showing male Taliban members in curious, effeminate poses.”

There are 48,000 ’security contractors’ in Iraq, working for private companies growing rich on the back of US policy. But can it be a good thing to have so many mercenaries operating without any democratic control?

An extract from Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army, by Jeremy Scahill.